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Abstract. Dual-use (DU) technologies are both a threat to human security 
and an opportunity to generate economic value. This article reflects on tensions 
between state preferences for greater competitiveness in DU technologies and 
its implications for human security. These tensions are analysed through the 
lens of the Ethics Issues Checklists (EIC) used by the European Commission 
(EC) to implement upstream controls on European DU research. We show that 
the shift towards an economistic framing of DU in the EICs privileges competi-
tiveness at the expense of security imperatives and thereby undermines Europe's 
commitments to human security as agreed in multilateral treaties. Furthermore, 
findings show a nuanced understanding of the EC's preference for economic 
considerations as it combines economic growth expectations from a more com-
petitive DU industry with a strengthening of Europe's hard power capacities via 
a strengthened domestic security industry. 
 
. 
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1 Introduction 
Dual-use technologies are both a threat to human security and an opportunity to gen-
erate economic value. As such, ‘dual-use’ (DU) refers to the possibility that research 
and technological developments designed to generate benefits for civilians can also be 
used for military or other purposes with non-peaceful intents. These include emerging 
technologies of immense promissory socioeconomic significance like artificial intelli-
gence and genetics which can be easily weaponised into autonomous warfighters, 
agents of bioterrorism, etc. Indeed, neuromorphic computing and other biologically-
inspired systems are increasingly recognized as DU areas of concern to researchers 
and regulators [1].  
 
The European Commission (EC) [2] defines 'dual-use items' as:  
 ...goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and mili-
tary applications and/or can contribute to the proliferation of Weapons of 
2 
Mass Destruction (WMD) [and thus] ...subject to controls to prevent the 
risks that these items may pose for international security.1 [bold added for 
emphasis]  
As the term international security suggests, the risks of DUIs are viewed by the EC as 
global (beyond the confines of national borders). DUI risks are governed by multilat-
eral treaties like the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Conventions (CWC) and the 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 
(amended in 2016). In turn, the problem of security risks posed by DUIs – according 
to the above definition - is resolved through controls. Within Europe, as in other na-
tions, controls in the DUI context derive from state obligations to multilateral treaties. 
These typically refer to policies aimed at controlling "the export, transit and brokering 
of dual-use items as a key instrument contributing to international peace and human 
security" [2] (hereafter referred as human security). As a result, this trade-based ap-
proach to managing the security risks posed by DUIs - or what the EC calls a "securi-
ty-related trade instrument" [2] - casts DUIs as tradable goods with all the concomi-
tant pros and cons of trade and commerce, such as interstate competitiveness and 
profit-driven micro interests. 
 
 This article takes a closer look at policies for upstream control of European 
DU research. The aim is to understand the human security implications of policy 
shifts towards greater competitiveness between 2009 and 2016 in Europe's interna-
tional trade in DUIs. We present an inward-looking analysis of security-trade dynam-
ics within the European Union (EU) from the perspective of international relations 
theory instead of the standard cross-national comparative studies [3]. Notably, for the 
purposes of this paper, we consider the EU as one analytical unit (interchangeably 
referred to as national). This is because the EC's DUI Export Control policies - pri-
marily Regulation ECR428/2009 - are centralised with the explicit aim of controlling 
the "export, transit and brokering" of dual-use items within the EU's Common Com-
mercial Policy regulating the European single market (Article 207 in Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union in [2]).  
 
 
1.1 DUIs and the EU economy  
 
International trade in DUIs makes a substantial contribution to Europe's economy. In 
the period 2008-2014, 20% of Europe's exports (worth €900 billion) fell within the 
DUI export control domain1 [4]. In approximately the same period (2008-2012), DUI 
and DUI-related sectors were estimated to have employed between 7 to 8.5 million 
people thus accounting for 14% of all export-based employment within the EU [4, p. 
19]. Given the immense socioeconomic value of trade in DUIs to the European econ-
omy, sustaining the DUI sector's international competitiveness is important for Eu-
rope's long-term growth objectives [2].  A review of the existing DUI export control 
                                                            
1 Including trade within EU and re-export [6], although Stewart [13] estimates the value 
of EU's DUI production substantially lower between €26 and €37 billion. 
3 
regime has been underway since 2011 to make the DUI sector more competitive by 
optimising the balance between "ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing 
world" [2, p. 5]. However, Stewart & Bauer [6, p. 23] have suggested that it was the 
USA's review and reform of its DUI export regime in 2009 (to make it more competi-
tive) that escalated Europe's competitive concerns. This triggered the EC's DUI re-
view process, which was backed by the European DUI industry's calls for relaxing the 
EU's stricter standards as compared to the USA and emerging competitors like China 
and India [see e.g. European Commission's Impact Assessment Report of 2016 in [5, 
p. 7] [6]. The question is: does the framing of the European DUI review process with 
competitiveness as a policy target (at par with security risks) suggest a state prefer-
ence for economic goals at the expense of human security goals?  
 
2  Method and Methodology  
 
To understand the co-existence of state preferences for specific economic (i.e. trade) 
and security goals [7], we draw on the specific case of upstream DU controls imposed 
on European research via the mechanism of Ethics Issue Checklists. According to 
Europe's key dual-use regulation ECR 428/2009, applicants for EC research funding 
are required to self-assess the dual use and potential misuses of their proposed re-
search by completing an Ethics Issues Checklist (EIC). Informed by concepts from 
international relations theory [7-11], we conducted discourse and content analysis of 
a) the changes to the EIC over the period 2009 - 2016; b) accompanying guidance 
notes for EIC applicants; and c) related policy documents to understand the tensions 
between state preferences for competitiveness and human security in the European 
DU domain. 
 
 
3  Findings 
 
Findings showed considerable variances in the content and intent of EICs issued be-
tween 2009 and 2016 towards an economistic framing of DU regulations. This privi-
leges the EC's unitary economic considerations at the expense of Europe's commit-
ment to human and international security as agreed in multilateral treaties like the 
BWC and CWC. Furthermore, our analysis suggests a nuanced understanding of the 
EU's preference for economic considerations as it combines economic growth expec-
tations from a stronger European DU innovation and industry along with a strengthen-
ing of the EU’s hard power capacities via a strengthened domestic security industry.  
 
4 Discussion 
 
Findings showed that the shift towards economic considerations between the 2014 
and 2016 EICs was underpinned by the EC’s strategic shift towards incentivising the 
defence sector to diversify into the civilian sector. This is done via the quick innova-
tion route of adapting DU defence technologies to civilian-use products aimed at cre-
ating wealth, jobs and growth for the aggregate European economy. The notion that 
4 
this shift was motivated by, and in the interests of, a few industry and private actors 
rather than the aggregate was unfounded. However, the 2016 EIC's silence on the 
questions of human rights and military ethics were concerning. One reason for these 
lack of human rights and ethics protections may have been motivated by the desire to 
smooth the defence sector's foray into the civilian sector; to bolster European DU 
innovation and industry with the expectation that it would contribute both to the EU's 
economic growth as well as its hard power via a strong European security industry.  
 
 Furthermore, findings showed that the 2014 EIC's strategy of discursively 
fragmenting the DU domain into good and bad to commercialise the good DU (like 
trade in DUIs) and prohibit bad DU or misuses like terrorist abuse, created ambiguous 
outcomes in the 2016 EIC. In the 2016 EIC, good DU was expected to bolster re-
search collaboration between defence-civilian sectors, eventually leading to a strong 
indigenous defence-security sector. In reality, the economistic framing of DUs weak-
ened the 2016 EIC to a tokenistic exercise of checking boxes about human security 
without "clear and enforceable safeguards" to ensure it [12]. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The discursive fragmentation of the DU domain into good and bad DU to serve eco-
nomic goals, - although understandable from the perspective of the relative benefits 
for the imagined aggregate European society - casts the EIC as a transaction cost or 
‘Administrative burden’ [according to DU review clause 1.1.5 & 6 in 4]. This is chal-
lenging for international security, for it hollows out the intent and content of security 
and rights protections agreed with other states and enshrined in multilateral agree-
ments towards greater competitiveness in international trade in DUIs. As history has 
shown, if other nations choose to enhance competitiveness following the example of 
the EC, it would suggest a global weakening of the protections against bioterrorism - 
especially in emerging biologically-inspired dual use technologies such as artificial 
intelligence and robotics. To avoid this global race to the bottom, it is thus imperative 
that the EIC – as a basic tool for controlling DUIs – should be strengthened, begin-
ning with a re-reframing of its purpose as a protective mechanism. 
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